Issue
Whether individuals born in United States territories, but not in the fifty states, are entitled to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts
American Samoa came under the umbrella of United States in 1900. Since 1950, American Samoa has made efforts to mimic the United States’ governing style, creating a bicameral legislature, electing a governor, and hosting an independent judiciary. American Samoa was designated as an “outlying possession of the United States,” meaning that Samoa is not intended to be incorporated as a state. Leneuoti Tuaua is a citizen of American Samoa, but as an outlying possession of the United States, Tuaua is not considered a United States citizen. He was informed of this when he was barred from becoming a police officer in California because he is a “non-citizen national.” Essentially, states and the federal government face serious questions about national allegiance and the potential for subversion if they hire individuals who are not U.S. citizens, especially in law enforcement.
After finding out that he would have to go through the naturalization process to become a citizen before becoming a police officer, Tuaua, along with four others, and supported by the Samoan Federation of America, brought suit against the United States, asserting that citizens of Samoa are citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States responded by moving to dismiss the case reasoning that the relief sought by Tuaua is not a claim upon which relief can be granted by the court.
The Court Below
The United States Court for the District of Columbia was the first to hear the case. The court ruled in favor of the United States on the grounds that the court does, in fact, have jurisdiction to hear the case and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee citizenship to individuals from unincorporated American territories citing the Supreme Court’s prior opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, which held the same thing. See opinion below:
Tuaua v. U.S., 951 F.Supp.2d 88 D.D.C., 2013
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Tuaua appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court ruled in favor of the United States, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee citizenship to individuals from an unincorporated American territory. See opinion below:
Tuaua v. U.S., 788 F.3d 300 D.C. Cir., 2015
Still dissatisfied with the ruling, Tuaua appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court decided not to hear the case, thus making the appellate court decision the final ruling on the matter. See opinion below:
Tuaua v. U.S., 136 S.Ct. 2461 U.S., 2016
Question before the Court
“The key question [is] whether American Samoa qualifies as a part of the ‘United States’ as that is used within the Citizenship Clause.”
CCJ filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the United States
Summary:
Place-of-birth citizenship is a vestige of feudalism which has been rejected by nearly every developed country. Place-of-birth citizenship was included in the U.S. Constitution as a pragmatic means of solving concrete structural problems. The Citizenship Clause is readily construed as validating the discretion congress has long exercised concerning whether, when, and how to offer citizenship to, or impose citizenship on, residents of U.S. territories. Prudential considerations weigh against a grant of certiorari in this case.
Place-of-birth citizenship is a vestige of feudalism which has been rejected by nearly every developed country. In feudal Europe, the king owned and controlled all the land in the kingdom, and everyone born on his soil automatically became, at birth, his subject, owing him – and only him – an unbreakable, lifelong duty of allegiance. This concept of justifying birthright citizenship is purely antithetical to the American way as the United States outright rejected monarchy. Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of countries ascribe citizenship to a newborn child through their line of descent, under which the child takes on the citizenship of the parents, no matter where the child is born. For example, a child born to Swiss parents in Russia would still be considered a Swiss citizen because the child’s parents are Swiss citizens. The child being born in Russia tells nothing about that child’s allegiances. Less than 20% of the world’s countries give citizenship based on location of birth. Only two countries with advanced economies do, being Canada and the United States.
Place-of-birth citizenship was included in the U.S. Constitution as a pragmatic means of solving concrete structural problems. Neither the Constitution of 1789 nor the Bill of Rights, added in 1791, recognized any individual rights regarding citizenship. Among the many individual rights listed, citizenship was not even mentioned. The Citizenship Clause, ratified as part of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, is most appropriately viewed as structural. It was the pragmatic device chosen by Congress to solve the problem created by this Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which declared that persons of African descent, even those who had never been held in slavery, could not be regarded as citizens, even if they had been born in the United States. During congressional deliberations, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated that its intended function was to replicate the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, on a constitutional level. Importantly here, birthright citizenship is not a feature of that Act. Nothing in the congressional debates concerning the Citizenship Clause suggests that the Members of Congress who framed it intended to create a norm that would in any way limit the discretion of the political branches of the federal government concerning the citizenship status of those residing in U.S. territories. To bind both the States and this Court to a definition of citizenship which included African Americans, one solution Congress considered was to simply legislate that “all persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States ….” Ultimately, to achieve its aim Congress used more general language, both in the Act and in the Citizenship Clause, thereby overruling Dred Scott.
The Citizenship Clause is readily construed as validating the discretion congress has long exercised concerning whether, when, and how to offer citizenship to, or impose citizenship on, residents of U.S. territories. Throughout our history the political branches have exercised wide discretion, without interference by this Court or by lower courts, concerning whether, when, and how to offer citizenship to, or impose citizenship upon, those residing in U.S. territories. In some situations, those domiciled in a newly acquired territory have automatically become U.S. citizens pursuant to a treaty governing acquisition of the territory. In other situations, the political branches have, during the acquisition of new territories, guaranteed that territorial inhabitants would enjoy the rights of U.S. citizens, but have stopped short of guaranteeing that the territories would eventually be incorporated into the Union as States. Examples include the acquisition of Oregon and Alaska. New territories have also been acquired without the political branches making any guarantees that territorial inhabitants would ever become U.S. citizens, as happened when Spain ceded Cuba, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico following the Spanish-American War.
Prudential considerations weigh against a grant of certiorari in this case. First, as set out above, the correctness of the result below does not depend on the status of the Insular Cases. Second, this case is hardly an apt vehicle for reconsidering the Insular Cases. The typical person disadvantaged by the Insular Cases is a U.S. citizen living in Puerto Rico who is denied an individual right that he would enjoy if he were living in a State. For example, the right to a jury trial on a criminal misdemeanor charge putting him or her at risk of more than six months incarceration. Finally, petitioners are mistaken in suggesting that Congress has somehow selectively targeted American Samoans as supposedly unfit to be the beneficiaries of statutory birthright citizenship. After all, Congress has by statute provided for birthright citizenship in every territory whose residents have expressed a collective desire to have it. No such statute applies to American Samoa because its people, through their elected representatives, have successfully urged Congress not to impose birthright citizenship on them, for fear that it might adversely impact their unique legal system and culture.
Feudalism birthed place-of-birth citizenship and while the countries that invented the concept have moved to a more practical system of citizenship based on the citizenship of one’s parents, the United States has lagged behind and still uses the feudal method. To be fair, place-of-birth citizenship was used to solve issues facing the United States in the 1860s, but those issues are no longer a pressing threat. Congress still retains the
The Citizenship Clause is readily construed as validating the discretion congress has long exercised concerning whether, when, and how to offer citizenship to, or impose citizenship on, residents of U.S. territories. Prudential considerations weigh against a grant of certiorari in this case
Final Outcome
The District of Columbia Circuit held that individuals from unincorporated territories are not guaranteed citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling in Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig 1984, that territories not intended to be incorporated as states, are granted “only [certain] fundamental constitutional rights [that] apply by their own force.” This is consistent with CCJ's argument.
