Issue
Whether the Town of Durham’s denial of Arrigoni's applications for land development permits constituted an unconstitutional inverse condemnation of Arrigoni's property. Furthermore, whether by denying its permit applications, the Town of Durham violated Arrigoni’s rights to substantive due process and equal protection.
Facts
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC is a business that has owned 9.1 acres of undeveloped land in the Town of Durham, Connecticut since 1955. Arrigoni decided that the time had come to develop the land. There are three industrial zones in Durham, Connecticut: a Design Development District DDD zone, a Light Industrial District LID zone, and a Heavy Industrial District HID zone. The property at issue in this case is located in Durham's only DDD zone. In 1986, the Durham Planning and Zoning Commission changed the zoning of the Property to LID. In 2005, Arrigoni sought approval for a zoning change from DDD to HID, which would allow it to excavate, crush, and remove earth on its property so that it could construct three light industrial buildings. The HID zone is the only zone in which rock crushing and removal is a permitted use. The Commission denied the zoning change request on May 4, 2005.
In 2005, Arrigoni applied to the Commission for a special development permit for the site development and construction of the three light industrial buildings pursuant to the Town of Durham Zoning Regulations. Arrigoni’s permit was denied. In August 2007, Arrigoni applied to the Durham Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance regarding the prohibition against rock crushing, arguing that the topography and geology of the Property was a hardship and that any development of the land would require the excavation, crushing and removal of the rock. The Board of Appeals denied the application. Arrigoni proceeded to sue the Town of Durham for denying equal protection, denial of substantive due process, and inverse condemnation or regulatory taking without compensation.
The Court Below
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut was the first to hear the case. The court dismissed the case as unripe for review. See opinion:
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, 606 F.Supp.2d 295 D. Connecticut, 2009
Arrigoni then reapplied for a permit and followed all procedures set out for rezoning. Upon being denied again, Arrigoni brought Durham back to the Connecticut district court. The district court ruled against Arrigoni reasoning that Durham provided adequate defenses to the equal protection and substantive due process claims. See opinion:
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, 2011 WL 4572025 D. Connecticut, 2011
Arrigoni then filed a motion for a declaratory judgment that the zoning regulation needs repealed for being too vague. Again in the District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court held that the zoning regulations were not too vague. See opinion:
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, 18 F.Supp.3d 188 D. Connecticut, 2014
Arrigoni then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court held that the inverse condemnation claim was unripe, that the zoning regulations were not overly vague, and that Arrigoni did not have a cognizable property interest in acquiring a special development permit. See opinion:
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, 629 Fed.Appx. 23 2nd Cir., 2015
Arrigoni then appealed to the Supreme Court, who declined to hear the case. However, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy did make a comment protesting the Court’s decision, calling for a reconsideration of Williamson County. Justice Thomas wrote that “both the text of the Takings Clause and historical evidence cast doubt on Williamson County's treatment of just compensation as a mere remedy, rather than a condition on the Government's eminent-domain power.” See statement below:
Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S.Ct. 1409 S.Ct., 2016
Question before the Court
The question presented by this petition is whether the Court should overrule Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, a 1985 case where the Supreme Court limited access to federal courts for individuals who allege uncompensated, direct taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment.
CCJ filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC
Summary:
The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The principle reflected in the Takings Clause dates back to the Magna Carta, itself over 800 years old. That principle has been carried forward throughout our history. For most of our history, the natural understanding of this clause, as reflected in the Court’s precedents, is that there shall be no taking of property without the simultaneous payment of “just compensation.” In the century following the Bill of Rights, this understanding persisted; compensation was required at the time of the taking. To reiterate, “just compensation” serves as a condition that must be satisfied for the government to exercise its power to effectuate a taking; it is not simply a remedy to be afforded to the landowner.
The Court ruled in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 1985 that a plaintiff's allegation that local government action resulting in a taking is not “ripe” for review in federal court until the plaintiff seeks compensation in state-created channels. In doing so, the Court superimposed a state-litigation requirement on the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Indeed, early courts recognized the conditionality of the compensation requirement, adopting an understanding whereby a failure to pay compensation would not simply give rise to a claim for compensation, but render the taking itself void. In other cases, a person who is having their property taken by the government, and is not being paid for that taking immediately, need not “ripen” their case by first going through all state-provided channels. Instead, that person should be able to seek their compensation in court immediately.
Confoundingly, the Court in Williamson County required exactly the opposite, mandating that takings claimants first seek in state court state-based compensatory remedies, such as rights afforded under state constitutions or remedies available through inverse condemnation proceedings. Because of this ruling, state tribunals essentially have been given the exclusive right to determine whether a federal right has been violated or not. This was never intended by the Founders. The critical misstep here is that the compensation clause is viewed as a remedy for taking property, not as a condition for taking it in the first place. The dark days that had preceded the Magna Carta in which compensation was an expectant potential remedy have returned; federal court doors that were once open for claimants seeking to compel the government to fulfill its obligation to make immediate payment have been all but closed.
The jurisprudential doctrine of “ripeness” permits a court to dismiss claims that are inappropriate for review upon their initial presentation. Ripeness traditionally operates to dismiss disputes involving things that have not happened or may not happen. Because people’s property already was taken, but they were not compensated at the time of the taking, there has already been a transgression of an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights. If the right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment is properly viewed as a condition to the exercise of the takings power, it is difficult to see how, once a final decision is rendered with respect to a taking, a Takings Claim can be unripe for review under either the constitutional or prudential ripeness inquiries.
In short, the state litigation rule cannot be explained by reference to Article III or to the traditional values underlying prudential ripeness, especially if compensation is properly viewed as being owed at the time of the taking. At best, the rule seems to be borrowed from the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, under which a claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before a claim becomes ripe. Finally, this Court has not usually required a plaintiff to satisfy any exhaustion rule before bringing a constitutional claim for a violation of a substantive constitutional right.
Final Outcome
The final decision-maker for this case ultimately became the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals because the Supreme Court decided not to take the case. The Sixth Circuit ruled against CCJ’s position, holding that a “de minimis effect on interstate commerce was constitutionally sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirement of Hobbs Act, and evidence that robbed pizzeria received its ingredients from various states was sufficient to satisfy requirement.” Essentially, the court ruled that the theft of a pizzeria is prosecutable in federal court because the ingredients to make pizzas came from across state lines.
