Freedom of Speech and Association

Vargas v. City of Salinas (2012)


  • August 26 2019

 

Issue

Whether the City of Salinas was illegally involved in the campaign against Measure O. Whether California’s Anti-SLAPP Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation legislation precluded Vargas’ lawsuit.

Facts

The controversy surrounding Vargas v. City of Salinas stems from a local ballot initiative by the name of Measure O. Upon passage, Measure O would affect the City’s Utility Users Tax UUT by immediately cutting it in half, and over a few years, entirely repeal it. After gathering the requisite signatures, the proponents of Measure O submitted the initiative to the county registrar of voters in September 2001. The Salinas City Council opted to direct the municipality's staff to prepare a report on the impact that the proposed ordinance would likely have. The report found that the repeal of UUT would handicap and substantially reduce services to the city’s residents. In light of the report, the city council put Measure O on the ballot for the upcoming November 2002 election.

In June 2002, the City Council of Salinas considered its budget for the upcoming 2002-2003 fiscal year. As it was undetermined whether voters would approve Measure O, the budget assumed that the revenue from UUT was available to the city. The city council formally voted in July 2002 to specify which particular facilities, services, and programs would be cut in the event of Measure O’s passage. The City produced and distributed a one-page flyer in both English and Spanish that explained the budget cuts to the public. This flyer appeared in the city’s October 2002 Newsletter alongside other non-UUT articles.

In November of 2002, Measure O was defeated by a vote of 34-66. Two weeks before the election, Angelina Vargas and Mark Dierolf had filed a lawsuit that asked the court to order a new election in light of the city’s one-sided involvement in the measure. City officials said that they had a right to express their opinions and that the leaflet did not expressly encourage voters to vote one way or the other on Measure O. City officials asked for a money award under a state law intended to protect citizens from lawsuits involving speech issues. This special motion to strike the complaint fell under anti-SLAPP legislation.  The Superior Court of Monterey County granted the motion.

The Court Below

While the Superior Court of Monterey County first granted Vargas and Dierolf’s motion, the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of California was the first to issue an opinion. The court ruled in favor of the City of Salinas, holding that the City of Salinas’ conduct was not exempt from anti-SLAPP protection and that Vargas did not demonstrate a likelihood of winning the case on the merits. See opinion below:

Vargas v. City of Salinas, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 506 Cal.App.6th, 2005

Vargas and Dierolf then appealed to the California Supreme Court, who ruled that the City of Salinas’ statements were constitutionally protected speech and went a step further, holding that it was proper for the city to spend public funds on website postings, newsletters, and a publically distributed document related to Measure O. See opinion below:

Vargas v. City of Salinas, 46 Cal.4th 1 Cal., 2009

After the California Supreme Court ruled on the matter, both Salinas and Vargas filed to get the other side to pay for their attorney fees in the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Vargas was ineligible to get attorney fees covered by Salinas because winning the case is a prerequisite to get attorney fees covered by the opposing party. The City of Salinas was granted their motion to get attorney fees from Vargas because they won their case and the court reasoned that doing so does not unconstitutionally burden the constitutional right to petition when applied in cases against the government. See opinion below:

Vargas v. City of Salinas, Cal, 200 Cal.App.4th 1331 Cal.App.6th, 2011

Upon receiving the bad news that they would be on the hook for the City of Salinas’ attorney fees, Vargas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court declined to hear the case without comment. See opinion below:

Vargas v. City of Salinas, 133 S.Ct. 424 U.S., 2012

Question before the Court

“The … question presented is whether section 425.16, subdivision c, infringes a plaintiff's constitutional right of petition by providing for mandatory fee awards to prevailing government defendants.”

CCJ filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Vargas

Summary:

Vargas advanced the public interest in bringing suit against the City of Salinas.  Yet, the trial court imposed, and the court below upheld, a punitive award of attorney fees against Vargas.  In making that ruling, the lower court failed to consider the public interest nature of Vargas’ complaint as commanded by Code of Civil Procedure §425.17. Section 425.17 exempts from the special motion to strike – and importantly here, the assessment of attorney fees following a successful motion, actions brought to advance the public interest. All of these elements appear on the face of Vargas’ action.  There is no requirement that the plaintiff succeed in the challenge, or even that she show a likelihood of success.  All that is important for this statute is that the action is brought to advance the public interest, as was the case here. Whether a local governmental agency can produce a “political work” related to an election campaign and still claim the action is exempt from analysis under Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206 1976, is an important question that this Court should review.

The right of petition is protected by both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 3a, of the California Constitution.  This right is “essential to . . . a free government.”  Although the right to petition has been characterized as complementary to the rights to free speech, press, assembly and expression of religion, its development indicates that it is the source of these other constitutional rights.

By the time of the American Revolution, the right to petition the government for redress of grievances had become well established by the common law of England.  Two distinct forms of petitioning were recognized under English common law:  general petitions and judicial petitions.  “‘General petitions’ involve citizens’ attempts to contribute to governmental decision making or to change governmental behavior. Judicial petitions are submitted to courts seeking the individualized resolution of disputes. Lawsuits brought against public entities encompass both of these forms of petitioning.

This case presents a classic example of the exercise of a right to petition.  Plaintiffs argued that the city was illegally seeking to influence the outcome of an election contest.  This Court in Stanson noted that such a claim raises “potentially serious constitutional questions.”  Stanson, 17 Cal. 3d at 217.  A petition for redress on this issue cannot effectively be submitted to the city.  The only government entity with the power to grant relief is the California judiciary.  Yet the decision below upholding the award of ruinous and punitive attorney fees against plaintiffs for bringing such a petition undercuts the rights guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions.  Especially in situations as we have in this case, where the law was so unclear that this Court characterized the analysis of the lower court as “fundamentally flawed,” great care should be exercised before taking an action that will effectively destroy the right to petition for redress of grievances.

Final Outcome

The Supreme Court declined to hear Vargas’ case, thus upholding the California Supreme Court’s ruling against Vargas and CCJ’s position and the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit’s award of attorney fees to the City of Salinas.