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Issue
Whether the Equal Protection clause prohibits a publicly funded university from using race as a prominent factor in determining student admissions.
Facts
The University of Michigan law school included race as a prominent factor in acceptance. It did so in order to promote greater representation of minorities within the university. The admissions program accepted students who qualified as racial minorities but had lower academic qualifications, and passed over students with higher test scores and higher GPAs because they were white or “non-preferred” minorities. Michigan resident, Barbara Grutter, had a 3.8 GPA and an LSAT score of 161. Both her grades and her test score qualified her for acceptance. Still, the university denied her admission in order to admit students of both lower test scores and GPAs because they were minorities.
In response, Grutter filed a suit on the basis that the University of Michigan’s admittance policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. She claimed that the state did not have a compelling interest to deny her admittance because of her race.
The Court Below
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan was the first court to hear the case. The court ruled in favor of Grutter, holding that a desire for “student body diversity” is an insufficient basis for the necessary “compelling state interest,” nor was the policy narrowly tailored enough to further that objective. See opinion below:
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 E.D. Mich., 2001
Bollinger appealed to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court reversed the ruling of the district court, holding that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest. See opinion below:
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 6th Cir. 2002
Grutter appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted Certiorari. The Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling on the grounds that law schools have a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body and Michigan’s admissions program was narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interest. Thus the admissions program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See opinion below:
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 2003
Question before the Court
Whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.
CCJ filed an amicus curie in support of Grutter
Summary:
The courts below misinterpreted and misapplied the Supreme Court’s precedent set in University of California v. Bakke 1978. In Bakke, the Court struck down a university’s application policy due to its use of race as an acceptance factor, stating, “[D]istinctions of any sort are inherently suspect.” The opinion also stated programs that seek to fix past discrimination by creating new discrimination unjustly “forc[e] innocent persons … to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.” The University of Michigan admitted that the white and non-preferred minority students, such as Asians, are passed over in order to admit “unqualified,” preferred minorities. The university was doing these unqualified students a disservice by forcing them to compete with students with significantly stronger academic credentials.
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke held that the states may have a “substantial” interest in considering race during admission. Yet previous courts have made clear that only “compelling” interest, and not “substantial” interest, justifies the state’s use of classification by race. A policy discriminating based upon race must be held to the strictest scrutiny. Furthermore, none of the other eight justices agreed with Powell in the stated portion of the opinion. Thus, even if Justice Powell’s remarks did condone Michigan’s policy, they should be overturned.
Ultimately, such a policy is unconstitutional as it violates the principle that “all men are created equal.” As Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 36, “The door ought to be equally open to all.” In one of the Court’s darkest hours, it ruled 8-1 in favor of segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson 1896. In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated, “The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights… are involved.” Fifty-eight years later his words were finally heeded in Brown v. Board of Education 1954. The Court renewed its dedication to Martin Luther King’s dream: that one day, the nation would stand for the truth that all men are created equal.
The University of Michigan did not narrowly tailor its programs to achieve “diversity.” An application program is only narrowly tailored if, in benefiting one party, it does not harm another. Michigan’s program punished individuals simply because of their race. The admissions policy also implied that an applicant's race is the determining factor in that applicant's character and quality as a student. According to the policy’s view, a black applicant is inherently different from—not equal to—the white applicant, because the content of the applicant's mind is thus determined by his race. This is the very definition of racism.
The procedures of the court below signify a return to racial classification, an action that the Court has worked to remove since Brown. Reliance on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke to rationalize racial classifications is no different than relying on Plessy v. Ferguson to justify “separate but equal” segregation. In the years preceding this case, the courts in numerous cases, including Adarand Constructors v. Pena 1995 and Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson 1997, have ruled again in favor of racial classification. Now is the time for the Court to determine, as it did in Green v. County 1968, that such inequality before the law is unacceptable and unconstitutional. Legal categorization by race must end “now.”
Final Outcome
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bollinger and against the arguments made by CCJ. Specifically, the Court ruled that the university had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body, and the admissions program qualified as narrowly tailored to serve this interest.
